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COME NOW Defendants and Appellants, TAYLOR SMITH an individual, and 
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation, and submit the following 
Brief pursuant to Rule 9, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
This appeal is subject to transfer by the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(4). The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals 
any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction with some exceptions 
not relevant in this case. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
Cases are transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court at Court's discretion not 
otherwise subject to original jurisdiction. The Supreme Court effected the transfer by Order 
dated November 10, 2005, effective 20 days from that date. 
There are no other related appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Issues Presented on Appeal: Did the trial court appropriately grant Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment against the Defendants based upon its ruling that Rule 
7(c)(3)(A), URCP, which provides in part that "....the moving party's memorandum is deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the responding party?" 
The court further found that the memorandum opposing summary judgment should "contain a 
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verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and may contain a 
separate statement of additional facts in dispute." The Court found no such facts in opposing 
counsel's memorandum to be in dispute. 
In appealing the trial court's ruling, Defendants/Appellants claim that the affidavit 
of the Defendant is sufficient to raise issues of fact and/or law which warrant a refusal by the trial 
court to grant the summary judgment relief requested. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 
(Utah, 1975). 
Defendants/Appellants further argue that even where if they failed to point out 
portions of the Plaintiffs memorandum facts which were in dispute, certainly, the affidavit in 
opposition pointed out and highlighted those very facts. Hence this court has the authority to 
deny summary judgment where the Plaintiff would not be entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law, i.e., where there were material facts which were in dispute. Ohvell v. Clark 658 
P.2df585 (Utah, 1982). 
Upon review of a grant of motion for summary judgment the Supreme Court 
applies the same standard as that applied by the trial court. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 
(Utah, 1977). 
Standard of Review: On review of an order granting summary judgment, the 
party against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the facts presented, and 
all inferences fairly arising therefrom considered in a light most favorable to him, Weinegar v. 
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2nd 104 (Utah, 1991). 
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STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiff filed a complaint on 7/27/04 in the above captioned action seeking the 
following relief: 
(A) A claim for breach of contract against the defendants claiming generally that 
the Defendants agreed to pay Bluffdale for water service. (Record at page 12) No allegation was 
made as to whether the agreement to pay was written or made orally. 
(B) A claim based upon promissory estoppel was made claiming that (i) 
Defendants promised to pay Bluffdale City for water service, (ii) that Bluffdale City relied on the 
promise of payment to its financial detriment, (iii) the obligation to enforce the agreement is 
necessary to avoid financial detriment, hence, (iv) the Defendants should be estopped from 
denying the existence of a contract or that they owe Bluffdale City for water services under the 
contract (never described as verbal or oral) (Record; at page 13). 
( C ) A claim for unjust enrichment claiming that (I) Bluffdale City provided 
water services to the Defendants (ii) that Defendants had knowledge of the benefits of water 
services provided, (iii) that Defendants accepted the water services from Bluffdale City, (iv) that 
to permit the Defendants to retain the benefits without compensation would constitute an 
unconscionable and unjust enrichment to Defendants at Plaintiffs detriment and (v) Plaintiff has 
suffered damage as a result of the unjust enrichment. (Record at page 14) 
In response to Plaintiffs Request for Admissions, Defendants denied the 
following: 
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(1) That they asked for water services in July, 1999. 
(2) That they received any water services from Bluffdale City. 
(3) That they agreed to pay Bluffdale City for water services. 
(4) That they have not paid Bluffdale City for water services. 
(5) That they breached a contract with Bluffdale City to pay for water services. 
(6) That Bluffdale City has been damaged in the amount of $11,385.62, as a 
result of Defendant's failure to pay for water services. 
(7) That they owe Bluffdale City money pursuant to a contract. (Record at pages 
17-19) 
Via a verified response to interrogatories, S. Taylor Smith, for himself and 
Wallingford Development, stated: 
"The claims of Plaintiff against the Defendants are without merit. 
Defendants have no responsibility to provide water to the property 
belonging to the Plaintiff, contractual or under any other theory of 
relief. In addition, the parties have resolved any and all claims 
against one another by virtue of a global settlement." (Record at 
page 117-118). 
S. Taylor Smith also stated under oath: 
"Taylor Smith only represented S.K. Development before 
Bluffdale City; however, he was never personally responsible 
under any contractual relationship. S.K. Development 
subsequently settled and claims Bluffdale City had against it." 
(Record at pages 117-118) 
The Defendants further claimed in their answers to interrogatories that Bluffdale City 
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provided the water for the parking strip which belonged to Bluffdale City and not the Defendants. 
(Record at page 11) 
In Brent Bluth's Affidavit dated April 26, 2005 in support of Plaintiff s Motion and 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, Mr. Bluth avers that as overseer of Bluffdale 
City's Water Department, that in approximately July, 1999, Taylor Smith, the Defendant, on 
behalf of himself and his company, Wallingford Development, asked Bluffdale for water service. 
(Record at pages 56-57) 
He further asserted that Bluffdale expected to be paid for water services provided to the 
Defendants, and sent water bills to the Defendants, but they went unpaid. He further asserted 
that the Defendants knew that the Plaintiff expected payment from between July 1, 199 to 
October 2, 2001, but despite this knowledge, the Defendants refused to pay. (Record at page 57) 
In his Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment dated April 26, 
2005, Shane Jones stated that S. Taylor Smith on behalf of Wallingford Development and 
himself, agreed to pay Bluffdale City for water services. Further he stated the Declaration of 
Covenants for Heritage Industrial Park recorded on January 29, 1998, stated "that the owner is to 
provided irrigation for all planting areas and landscaping including City parkstrips of the 
commercial site. See Declaration of Covenants page 28, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"." 
(Record at page 50) 
He further claimed that on September 9, 1999 he sent Taylor Smith a letter 
memorializing the agreement." (Record at pages 50, 54) 
In Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Affidavit of S. 
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Taylor Smith in Support of the Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Mr. Smith effectively denies all of the allegations which Mr. Bluth and Mr. Jones 
made in their assertions in favor of the Motion for Summary Judgment. For example, Mr. Smith 
states in his affidavit in opposition that at no time did he either for himself or on behalf of 
Wallingford Development agree to pay Bluffdale City for water services for the park strip in 
question. He claims that although he was approached several times by representatives of 
Bluffdale City to sign an agreement to pay for water services, he refused each time. (Record at 
pages 117-118) 
He further states that the letter referred to by Ms. Jones dated September 9, 1999 was sent 
to him after he has refused to pay for water services, hence, there could not be any agreement to 
pay for water services or inferences to pay for water services. (Record at page 118) 
He further claims that the Restrictive Covenants referred to by Mr. Jones was not between 
himself, personally, and the Bluffdale City . (Record at page 118) 
Additionally, he states that neither he nor Wallingford Development were signators on the 
Restrictive Covenants (Record at pages 117-118) 
Finally, he states there is a "global settlement of all claims" to which Bluffdale City is a 
signator and which should inure to the benefit of the Defendants as against Bluffdale City's 
claims in this case. (Record at page 118) 
These allegations of the Plaintiff via affidavit and cross-affidavits of the Defendants set 
up conflicting material issues of fact which require testimony and a decision by a trier of fact, 
and which further prevent entry of an order of summary judgment. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE ON 
APPEAL 
Determinative law: Rule 56, URCP, Rule 7(c)(3)(A), URCP; Rule 7(c)(3)(B), 
URCP. 
Rule 56, URCP: "A party seeking to recover upon a claim....may at any time 
after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after the expiration of 20 
days from the commencement of the action....move with or without supporting affidavits for a 
summary judgment...." 
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, 
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that 
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein...When a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial...." 
Rule 7(c)(3)(A), URCP: " A memorandum supporting a motion for summary 
judgment shall contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no 
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation 
to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the moving 
party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
controverted by the responding party." 
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Rule 7(c)(3)(B), URCP: "A memorandum opposing a motion for summary 
judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of 
the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of 
the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or 
discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact 
shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting materials such as 
affidavits or discovery materials." 
Section 25-5-4(l)(b): 'The following agreements are void unless the agreement, 
or some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party charged with 
the agreement: ....(b) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order by the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of 
the Plaintiff/Appellee and against the Defendants/Appellants on a claim for water service from 
July, 1999 to October, 2001 for $10,241.71, plus late penalty fees in the sum of $3,404.11, plus 
interest. 
The decision of the trial court in awarding the Plaintiff Summary Judgment was 
entered November 7, 2005. 
This appeal was filed November 7, 2005. 
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Factual Summary: 
In 1998, Mr. Steven Sinner through his corporation, SK Development, and S. 
Taylor Smith, through his corporation, Wallingford Development and/or Meridian Development, 
formed a joint venture for the purpose of developing a 29-lot "industrial park", called "The 
Heritage Industrial Park, in Bluffdale, Utah. The relative "ownership" of shares of the two 
entities were derived by the number of lots each business entity would own following the platting 
thereof. SK Development owned 15/29 or 15 lots and Wallingford owned 14/29 or 14 lots. SK 
Development, on behalf of the joint venture, signed all of the agreements with Bluffdale City and 
others. 
As part of the development approval process, SK Development was obligated as required 
by Bluffdale City Ordinance, to provide "bonding" to guarantee the installation of the public 
improvements (streets, paving, sidewalks, water and sewer lines, and so forth.) If the 
improvements were so installed, inspected and accepted by the City, the "bond' after being held 
for a one-year guarantee period to assure the installed improvement would be durable and lasting, 
would be released by the City in case the developer failed to fully install the "public 
improvements", as required by the City. 
The Plaintiff, Bluffdale City, alleged in its amended complaint dated July 24, 
2004, that Defendants, Taylor Smith and/or Wallingford Development, Inc. (Wallingford) 
received water services from Bluffdale in approximately July, 1999 through October, 2001, when 
it was discontinued, and refused to pay for them. The Plaintiff is sought $ 10,241.71 in water 
fees plus penalties from Bluffdale for water services allegedly provided. 
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Further, Bluffdale alleged that it had a written contract with the Defendants to 
provide water service to them. As support for this proposition, Bluffdale alleges that 
Wallingford signed the Restrictive Covenants which state that the owner of the property is to 
provide "irrigation for all planting areas, all landscaping, including park strips of its Commercial 
Site." Thus, Bluffdale concluded that Wallingford had a contractual duty under the Restrictive 
Covenants to provide irrigation to the park strips of its commercial development, regardless of 
who owned the park strips, including Bluffdale. 
In his affidavit in opposition to Bluffdale's motion for summary judgment, Smith averred 
that though approached several times by Bluffdale's agent, Shane C. Jones, to sign an agreement 
to set a meter and to pay for water on the park strips, he refused each time to do so, and that he 
never agreed to Jones' letter of understanding dated September 9, 1999 regarding payment for 
water on the parking strips. Bluffdale admits there was no written agreement between Smith, 
Wallingford and Bluffdale to pay for water on the park strips but, instead alleges that the 
Restrictive Covenants, obligated it and/or Smith to pay for water usage on the park strips 
regardless of who owned the park strips. 
There is no evidence adduced that Smith, individually, signed the Restrictive Covenants 
or agreed to be personally liable for water services allegedly rendered by Bluffdale to the park 
strips. (See Attachment "G") 
Further, Smith denies the legal conclusion drawn by Bluffdale that the Restrictive 
Covenants represent an implied promise on his part to pay for water usage or obligation to pay 
Bluffdale for water usage. 
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Next, Bluffdale asserts that the settlement between SK Development and 
Bluffdale dated May 20, 2004 did not render the lawsuit in question moot, that it was not a 
"global settlement",and was only intended to resolve issues between SK Development and 
Bluffdale in Civil No. 020401195, and not as to Smith and Wallingford. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
There remain factual issues which prevent the granting of summary judgment in this case. 
The trial court's decision and order granting summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and 
against the Defendants should be ordered reversed for the following reasons: 
A. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 7( c )(3) (B)Rule has been substantially complied with 
in that the affidavit opposing the motion for summary judgment effectively refuted every material 
fact which the Plaintiff claim supports is motion for summary judgment. 
B. A factual issue remains as to whether or not there was an agreement between the 
parties (verbal or otherwise) wherein the Defendants agreed to pay for water services for the 
parking strips in question. 
C A factual issues whether the Defendants have been unjustly enriched by provision of 
water on the parking strips in question. 
D The Defendant, S. Taylor Smith, was never personally a party to any agreement to 
agree to pay for water services on the parking strips in question and/or a party to the Restrictive 
Covenants which allegedly require the Wallingford Development to pay for water services. 
E.. There exists a global settlement between Bluffdale City and/or the Defendants which 
stands as a defense to any payment of water services. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
DEFENDANTS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY 
COM PLIED WITH RULE 7( c ) (3) (B), URCP 
While Rule 7(c)(3)(B), URCP provides that a memorandum opposing a motion for 
summary judgment is to contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that 
is controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute, those facts 
can be controverted by affidavits and other discovery materials. 
In this case the memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment alleged 
claims of the Plaintiff which were controverted by the Defendants and which also was supported 
by an affidavit which essentially controverted by sworn testimony each allegation contained in 
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. While no reference was made to page numbers, 
references were made to the Complaint and Affidavits of Plaintiffs The court should find that the 
Defendants are in substantial compliance with the rule and that there is precedence to allow the 
court to do so.. Owell, ID. 
II 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE DENIED 
BECAUSE THERE REMAINS A MATERIAL 
FACTUAL ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE 
DEFENDANTS ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT 
(VERBAL OR OTHERWISE) TO PAY PLAINTIFF 
FOR WATER PROVIDED 
The Plaintiff alleges through if affiants, Mr. Bluth and Mr. Jones, that the Defendants, 
Mr. Smith, and Wallingford Development, through Mr. Smith, agreed to pay for Bluffdale City's 
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water services. No allegation was ever made, nor were there any exhibits produced to show that 
either Smith or Wallingford ever agreed in writing to pay for water services. Apparently, the 
Plaintiff was basing its claim upon oral assurances by the Defendants of their intent to make 
payments for the park strip in question, and this was sufficient to support claims in contract, 
estoppel and unjust enrichment. 
But these assertions by the Plaintiff that the Defendants have agreed to pay for water 
services, albiet, oral in nature, are soundly refuted by the responses to request for admission, the 
verified responses to interrogatories and the Affidavit of S. Taylor Smith in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Before the trial court can grant a motion for summary judgment, the party against whom 
the judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the facts presented, and all inferences fairly 
arising therefrom considered in a light most favorable to him. Weinegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 
P.2nd 104 (Utah, 1991). So too, with this Honorable Court. It must review all inferences from 
the affidavits of the Defendants, and the responses to discovery in a light most favorable to the 
Defendants. Doing so would compel a reversal of the trial court's order granting summary 
judgment. 
Ill 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE DENIED 
BECAUSE THERE REMAINS A MATERIAL 
FACTUAL ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE 
DEFENDANTS WERE UNJUSTLY ENRICHED 
BY PLAINTIFF HAVING PROVIDED WATER 
TO THE PARKING STRIPS 
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The "unjust enrichment" claim of the city is a claim that the Defendants requested water 
services, were provided with water services, knew that the Plaintiff anticipated payment for the 
water, and thus by having provided water services, the Defendants were unjustly enriched by 
having received water from the city to water the city's parking strips. 
The argument fails, ever, because the parking strips belonged to the city and not to the 
Defendants, and if anyone was enriched by the provision of water to the parking strips, it was 
Bluffdale City. The waters were utilized to water grass and other vegetation along the parking 
strips in a dedicated "public" street right-of-way. Arguably, action of attempting to collect 
monies from a private party for waters used to water a public use parking strip, particularly after 
the parking strips had been formally dedicated to the city, amounts to an unlawful taking 
protected under the United States Constitution and by the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
Additionally, the when after repeated demands for payment, the Plaintiff had a duty to 
mitigate any damages it claims to have incurred, which it failed to apparently do. It provided 
water services for nearly two years without any payment. 
IV 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE DENIED 
BECAUSE THERE REMAINS A MATERIAL 
FACTUAL ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE 
DEFENDANT, S. TAYLOR SMITH, WAS EVER 
PERSONALLY OBLIGATED TO PAY THE 
PLAINTIFF'S WATER BILL 
In responses to interrogatories dated Marcy 21, 2005, S. Taylor Smith, for himself and on 
behalf of Wallingford Development, Inc., averred under oath that neither he nor Wallingford 
Development ever agreed to pay for water services on the city's parking strip, as was claimed by 
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Bluffdale City. Additionally, in his Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Defendant Smith averred that neither he for himself, nor on behalf of Wallingford 
Development, ever requested water service from the Plaintiff, Bluffdale City. (See Affidavit of 
S. Taylor Smith in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, page 2) This is 
indirect contradiction to Plaintiffs allegation that "in approximately July, 1999, defendant, 
Taylor Smith, on behalf of himself and his company, Defendant, Wallingford Development, 
requested water service from Bluffdale." (Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, page 2) 
Such a conflict in the alleged facts raises an issue for the trier of fact, and one upon which 
the court could rely in denying the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Additionally, Smith alleges in the same Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment that though approached several times by Bluffdale City to agree for payment 
of water services, he refused to enter into any such agreement. The question is raised: If 
Bluffdale knew of Smith's refusal to pay, why did they keep the water on for more than a year 
after September 9,1999 and continue charging Smith and/or Wallingford for the water service? 
Furthermore, the Restrictive Covenants upon which the Plaintiff says it relies, are one in 
which the Defendant, Smith, was not a party personally. If this is the case, how could the court 
hold him personally liable? 
Finally, any alleged obligation of Smith to answer for the obligation of Wallingford is 
void and violates the Statute of Frauds (Section 25-5-4((l)(b), since admittedly, the obligation 
was allegedly arose out of Restrictive Covenants, to which Smith was not personally a party, and 
since it was never in writing, even if the court were to believe Smith made a promise to pay. 
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V 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE DENIED 
BECAUSE THERE REMAINS THE PARTIES 
ENTERED INTO A GLOBAL SETTLEMENT OF 
ALL CLAIMS INCLUDING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM 
FOR WATER REIMBURSEMENT 
As part of a lawsuit captioned SK Development vs. Bluffdale City, the parties, including 
Wallingford Development entered into a mutual release of claims. The Mutual Release stated in 
relevant party: 
4. Mutual Release of All Claims. "As part of this Agreement, 
Developer and City, for and behalf of themselves and their 
respective owners, employees, agents, indemnitors, insurers, 
successors, and assigns, hereby release and forever discharge 
each other, together with their owners, employees, agents, 
indemnitors, insurers, successsors, and assigns, from any and all 
claims, demands, liabilities, damages, causes of action, costs and 
expenses, including attorney's fees, arising out of or in any way 
connected with the Litigation. Its is the intent of the parties to 
fully and completely release each other from any and all claims in 
any way related to the Litigation as more fully described therein. If 
is further understood that this Agreement has been entered into by 
the parties for the purpose of compromising disputed claims and 
shall not be construed as an admission of wrongdoing or liability on 
the part of any of the parties, and any such liability or wrongdoing is 
expressly denied." (Emphasis mine) 
Since SK Development was a party to this release, and was one of the joint venturers 
involved in the development of Heritage Industrial Park, it can be inferred that this Agreement 
has been entered into by the parties for the purpose of compromising of compromising of the 
$10,000+ for culinary charges arising from the Heritage Industrial Park development; namely, 
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those "waters" (and/or the availability thereof, even if there weren't any waters actually utilized") 
together with "late fees" for the delinquent payment thereof, for the "park strip" vegetation 
installed as part of the Industrial Park development, after formal "dedication" of the 
improvement (at the plat recordation stage), but prior to the city's "final release of the 
"improvement bond." 
The Plaintiff suggests that the release does not relate the their claim for damages against 
the Defendants for water usage of the parking strip. The term "the Litigation", as used in the 
mutual release should not, however, be so narrowly construed as to prevent a release of the city's 
water claim. To do so would frustrate the very purposes and whole concept of a "general 
release." The term "the Litigation" should be interpreted broadly so as to include all claims, 
present or prospective, plead or not, which might have been filed or claimed at the time of the 
signing of the release. 
Utah Case law supports the foregoing construction. In Todaro v. Gardner, 3 Utah 2d 
404, 285 P2d 839 (Utah, 1955) the court concluded a counterclaim not presented to the court on 
a matter involving the same transaction is forever barred. In Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P2d 714 
(Utah, 1985), the court held that a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction, that was 
subject of the other lienholder's claim was compulsory and failure to file a counterclaim resulted 
in a waiver of that claim. 
Similarly, in this case, when the parties and their "agents" (e.g. Wallingford 
Development) negotiated a release, prepared by Bluffdale City, against whom construction must 
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be construed, the "release" works not only for the benefit of SK Development buy also its agent, 
Wallingford . The determinative factor is not whether Bluffdale City plead the water claim 
against SK Development, but whether it should have plead the claim, and did not. 
To allow Bluffdale City to hold their "culinary water claim" hidden in its hip 
pocket offends there very principles of law, contractual or otherwise, and which make the general 
release a viable offense to the claims of the Plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
There are several issues of fact which remain to be decided by a trier of fact that have not 
been admitted to in these proceedings, and which warrant this Court in reversing the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants. Facts which 
remain to be decided by the trier of fact include: 
A. Whether or not there was an agreement between the parties (verbal or otherwise) 
wherein the Defendants agreed to pay for water services for the parking strips in question. 
B. Whether the Defendants have been unjustly enriched by provision of water on the 
parking strips in question. 
C. Whether the Defendant, S. Taylor Smith, was ever personally a party to any 
agreement to agree to pay for water services on the parking strips in question and/or a party to the 
Restrictive Covenants which allegedly require the Wallingford Development to pay for water 
services. 
D. Whether there was a global settlement between Bluffdale City and/or the Defendants 
which would create a defense to any payment of water services. 
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Dated t h i s ^ ^ day of March, 2006. 
p/ i. 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANTS' 
BRIEF ON APPEAL to Counsel for the Plaintiff/Appellee tinsXl day of March, 2006, 
addressed as follows: 
DALE GARDINER 
GRAIG R. KLEINMAN 
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER 
Attorneys at Law 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3434 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
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ADDENDUM 
The following are attached: 
(A) The order granting summary judgment from which this appeal is taken. 
(B) The notice of appeal. 
( C ) Settlement Agreement dated May 20, 2004 between SK Development, Inc. 
and Bluffdale City. 
( D ) Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
( E ) Defendants' Reply Memorandum Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Affidavit in Support Thereof. 
(F ) Jones proposed letter of understanding dated September 9, 1999. 
(G) Restrictive Covenants 
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ATTACHMENT "A" 
Order Granting Summary Judgment 
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DALE GARDINER (#1147) 
CRAIG R. KLEINMAN (#8451) 
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER 
60 East South Temple, #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3434 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bluffdale City 
Third Juc r^&ai District 
SAi.7 LASCH C O U N T V v ^ - , 
By— KL<L 
Deputy Clttk 
ENTERED; IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS'.-^ 
DATE 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah Municipal 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TAYLOR SMITH, an individual; and 
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
a Utah Corporation 
Defendants. 
FINAL JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANTS TAYLOR SMITH 
AND WALLINGFORD 
DEVELOPMENT, INC. 
Civil No. 040914276 
Judge Atherton 
The Court having granted Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and good cause 
appearing therefore, final judgment is entered as follows: 
1. Judgment is awarded in favor of Plaintiff Bluffdale City and against Defendant 
Taylor Smith, an individual, and Defendant Wallingford Development, Inc., a Utah Corporation, 
i and' 
in the amount of $11,997.05 for breach of contract and thereafter post-judgment interest at the 
statutory rate until paid in full; and 
2. Judgment is awarded in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants for costs in the 
amount of $240.00, for a total judgment of $12,237.05. 
3. It is further ordered that this judgment shall be augmented in the amount of 
reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting the judgment by execution or otherwise 
as shall be established by affidavit. 
DATED this % day of 'fUihr. , 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
erton 
Approved as to form 
David K. Smith 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINAL 
JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS TAYLOR SMITH AND WALLINGFORD 
DEVELOPMENT, INC. was served via U.S. First Class Mail, postage prepaid on the \*$* 
day of October, 2005 to the following: 
David K. Smith 
6925 Union Park Center 
Suite 600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
3 
ATTACHMENT "B 
Notice of Appeal 
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DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Utah State Bar No. 2993 
Suite 600 
6925 Union Park Center 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
Facsimile: (801) 566-8763 
Attorney for Defendants: S. TAYLOR SMITH, an individual, and 
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
A Utah Corporation 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TAYLOR SMITH, an individual; and 
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) Case No. 040914276 
) Honorable Judith Atherton 
COME N OW the Defendants, TAYLOR SMITH, an individual, and 
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation, and appeal the 
Judgment and the whole thereof entered in the above-captioned proceeding on or about 
October 13, 2005. 
? 11 r 
f'T _ 7 
' 1 • !,P 
i • i-' CI l -
 L
' U 
J o riiCl 
I "rhiy CUkK 
1 
DATED this I day of November, 2005. 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendants 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
Fax: (801) 566-8763 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE 
OF APPEAL to Counsel for the Plaintiff this _ l day of November, 2005 addressed 
as follows: 
DALE GARDINER 
CRAIG R. KLEINMAN 
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER 
60 East South Temple, #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3434 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
3 
ATTACHMENT "C 
Settlement Agreement dated May 20,2004 
between SK Development, Inc. and Bluffdale City 
Page 29 of 33 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
AND MUTUAL GENERAL RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS 
SK Development, Incorporated, a Utah corporation ("Developert), and Bluffdale 
City, a municipality and political subdivision of die State of Utah ("City")] hereby enter 
into this Settlement Agreement and Mutual General Release of All Claims if the 
"Agreement") as of this 70 day of y^p. f-
ies 
., 2004, for the purpose of 
settling and resolving certain claims, controversies, disputes, and legal actidns between diem 
on die terms and conditions and for the considerations set forth below. 
1. Intent of the Parties. Developer commenced a legal action iii tne Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. 020401195, assigned 
to the Honorable Denise P. Lindberg asserting various claims regarding bond agreements 
for the completion of improvements in the Heritage Industrial £ark Subdivision. The City 
filed an Answer and Counterclaim with respect to diose same issues (collectively the 
"Litigation"). It is the intent and purpose of the parties to this Agreement to fully settle, 
compromise and resolve all claims, controversies and disputes between thein arising out af 
or in any way related to the Litigation, resulting in the dismissal of the Litigation with 
prejudice and upon the merits. 
2. Dismissal of the Litigation. The parties hereby agree that a stipulation, 
motion and order of dismissal will be executed by counsel for Developer and the City and 
filed with the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Iptah, in Civil 
No. 020401195, dismissing the Litigation with prejudice and upon the merits, with all 
parties to bear their own costs and attorney's fees. 
3. Payment for Completion of Improvements. As part of this Agreement, 
Developer pays concurrently with the execution and/or delivery of this Agreement the sum 
of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000) for the completion of any public improvements which 
are associated with the claims of both parties as more fully set forth in the litigation. In 
consideration of the receipt of the $10,000, Bluffdale City fully and immecjiately releases the 
"bonds33 (in whatever form and surety) and discharges the obligations thereunder, including 
any obligation of the surety, for all phases (1, 2 and 3) of the Heritage Industrial Park, as 
follows: 
Phase 1 United Fire and Casualty Company "bond," dated as of 6/8/99 
Phase 2 First Security Bank (now Wells Fargo Bank) account Mumber 
254-10249-11 
Phase 3 First Security Bank (now Wells Fargo Bank) account [number 
254-10254-13 
Phase 3 First Security Bank (now Wells Fargo Bank) account number 
254-1025991 
To the extent that the "bonds'3 are actually trust accounts held by the designated financial 
institutions (and/or their successor-in-interest, i.e., Wells Fargo Bank), those financial 
institutions are authorized and directed to immediately release all monies contained in the 
accounts to the depositor thereof (i.e., SK Development and/or WallingfoJd Development). 
An original copy of this Agreement (or a photocopy thereof) shall be suffidient authority for 
the surety to immediately release said funds to the depositor, notwithstanding any other 
provisions within the contractual documents or Bluffdale City ordinances to the contrary 
(pertaining to the release of the bonds and/or for the documentation necessary to 
implement said release). 
4. Mutual General Release of All Claims. As part of this Agreement, Developer 
•and City, for and on behalf of themselves and the respective owners, employees, agents, 
indemnitors, insurers, successors, and assigns, hereby release and forever discharge each 
other, together with their owners, employees, agents, indemnitors, insurers, successors, and 
assigns, from any and all. claims, demands, liabilities, damages, causes of action, costs and 
expenses, including attorney's fees, arising out of or in any way connected with the 
Litigation. It is the intent of the parties to fully and completely release each other from any 
and all claims in any way related to the Litigation as more fully described therein. It is 
further understood that this Agreement has been entered into by the parties for the purpose 
of compromising disputed claims and shall not be construed as an admission of wrongdoing 
or liability on the part of any of the parties, and any such liability or wrongdoing is 
expressly denied 
5. Integration. This Agreement contains the entire agreement and 
understanding of the parties with respect to the subject matter herein, and integrates all 
prior conversations, discussions or undertakings of whatever kind or naturq and may only 
be modified by a subsequent writing duly executed by the parties hereto. 
6. Counterparts. Tliis document may be executed in one or mQre counterparts, 
which together shall constitute one and the same document, 
WHEREFORE, the parties have executed the foregoing to be effective the date first 
appearing above. 
SK DEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATED 
By-
its ^ZEgmgX i r -
BLUFFDALE Cny 
Attest: 
X 
Bluffdale City RecWer 
Approved as to form-
B. 
Hpmcr 
"neyfor SKDevelopmaii I u 
'V^A^A^T^ 
lurnc JodjKl 
\rtorni/for BJufidait ULy 
cr, Mayor 
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ATTACHMENT "D 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
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DALE GARDINER (#1147) 
CRAIG R. KLEINMAN (#8451) 
PARRY ANDERSON & GAR I >l \ > • 
60 East South Temple, #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)521-3434 
Attorney, lor riuinutt Biuikialc i ily 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT I.AKK ( Ol'N l'\ . ST ATI OF V 
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah Municipal 
Corporation, 
Piaint in , 
vs. 
TAYLOR SMITH, an individual... 
WALLINGFORD DI-\ (I - >PVI \ 
a I!';>.'-•• Corporal i. i 
Defendants. 
BLUFFDALE CITY'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
C i ' il Phi H l l ) l ) ! 4 : 7 ( i 
Judge Atherton 
Pursuant to Rules 7(c)(3)(A) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff 
this Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendants asked for water service from Bluffdale in approximately July, 1999. It is 
undisputed that Bluffdale provided water service to Defendants and that Defendants have refused 
to pay for it. This Court should order that Defendants pay for the water service which was 
provided by Bluffdale. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Bluffdale is a Utah municipal corporation which provides water services for its 
residents. See Amended Complaint at H 3 and Answer to Complaint ^ 2. 
2. In approximately July, 1999, Defendant Taylor Smith, on behalf of himself and 
his company, Defendant Wallingford Development, requested water service from Bluffdale. See 
Affidavit of Shane Jones at ^ 5 (attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). 
3. Bluffdale agreed to provide water services to Defendants. See Jones Aff. at f 6. 
4. Bluffdale expected to be paid for the water services it provided to Defendants. 
See Jones Aff. at f 7. 
5. Bluffdale sent water bills to Defendants but they were not paid. See Affidavit of 
Brent Bluth at p (attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). 
6. Defendants agreed to pay for the water services and they did not pay for the water 
services. See Jones Aff. at ^ 8. See also Bluth Aff. at % 9. 
2 
j The Declaration of Covenants for Heritage Industrial Park, the development 
which received the water services which is the subject of this matter, state that the owner is to 
j 1111\ in lr iiiiujilinii l'inn iill pl,inlni|> area'. .IIKI lannlsi/apii!)"1 in* lmliii|> l 'ily park s f ™ if is nil llir 
commercial site. See Junes AH", at f 9. 
8. I;.. .^ cpiwiw.^ i -. 1999, Bluffdale City engineer, >AI„.^ Jones sent a letter to 
Defendant Taylor Smith memorializing the agreement that he (Taylor Smith), "as the developer 
will be responsihk to pa> for the water that is used until each lot has its own irrigation system 
and the system -. • * .
 t . • _ . - 1 . 
9. Alternatively, Defendants knew that Bluffdale expected to be paid for the water 
services it provided to Defendants, Sec Tones .\H j -
10.' Bli iffdal* MI ;lie- -,••!• i !> i . ! • ... - I - - • ^ . • .
 s 
they received, See Jones Aff. -i; \ • : See also Bluth Aff at f 11 
11. Bluffdale provided "\ \ ater ser\ ices to Defendants from Jul) 1, 1.999 to October 2, 
2001. See Amended Complaint at f 3 and Answer to Complaint admitting this allegation at f 2 
(attached hereto as Exhibit "C"). See also Affidavit of Brent Bluth at f 12. 
12. Despite receipt of sei • eral n< Dtices of delinqi i = fit payment, Defe ndants ha^  're refi lsed 
to pay for the water services they received from Bluffdale. See Amended Complaint at ]] 7 and 
Answer to Complaint '| 6. See also Bluth / Iff, at 'f 13 
13. Defendants have incurred water services charges in the sum of $ 11,997.05 for 
water services provided by Bluffdale. See also Bluth Aff. at f 15. 
I. BLUFFDALE IS ENTITLED TO ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ALL 
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 
A. Standard of Review for Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Emphasis added). "A major purpose of 
summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings to 
determine whether there is a genuine issue to present to the fact finder." Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984). Rule 56 is "designed toward 
effectuating an inexpensive and expeditious determination of litigation;" accordingly, summary 
judgment is appropriate to achieve this goal where there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact. See Aetna Loan Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. ofMd9 22 Utah 2d 252, 255, 346 P.2d 1078, 
1079 (Utah 1959). 
Accordingly, "[t]he trial judge not only can but should grant a motion for summary 
judgment if he feels certain that he would rule that way no matter what proof a party could 
produce in support of his contentions." Pioneer Savings & Loan Ass 'n v. Pioneer Finance & 
Thrift Co., 18 Utah 2d 106, 109, 417 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah 1966)(emphasis added). The grounds 
4 
for this motion are that the pleadings on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, 
tjpt.t^iv onriched. Specifically, it is undisputed that Defendants requested water service from,. 
Biutidule, Bluffdale provided water service to Defendants and Defendants have failed to pay for 
the \ \ ater sen ices pro\ ided 
B. • First < ;. or Relief ih h-ndants Breached rheir Contract to Pi t) foi 
Water Services 
prove the following: (1) a contract; (2) performance by the party seeking recovery; (3) breach of 
the contract by the other party; and (4) damages. See />w</ > Axmn T,\^/L , , ( . :o ; •„ ,,;,, 
392 (I Itah 2001) Based on the i indisputed fac ^K/IV ; * iu genuine issue of material lact as to 
each of the elements of Bluffdale's cause of action for breach of contract as alleged in the 
complaint. 
As set forth above, Bluffdale had an oral agreement with Defendants to provide water 
services to Defendants property, Bluffdale has fully performed its obligations under the 
Agreement b> pro < • iding w ater sei v ices to Defendai its Defendants ha\ e breached their 
obligations under the Agreement by not paying for the water services and Bluffdale has been 
because Defendants have failed to fulfill all of their ob^.'atiuiis under the agreement. 
C. Second Claim for Relief- Defendants Have Been Unjustly Enriched. 
In order to establish an unjust enrichment cause of action under Utah law, a plaintiff must 
prove the following three elements: (1) a benefit was conferred on one person by another; (2) 
conferee must appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit; and (3) there must be acceptance or 
retention by the conferee of benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for 
conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value. See Groberg v. Housing 
Opportunities, Inc. 2003 UT App \ 21, 68 P.3d 1015. Based on the undisputed facts, there is no 
genuine issue of material fact as to each of the elements of Bluffdale's cause of action for unjust 
enrichment as alleged in the complaint. 
Bluffdale conferred the benefit of water services upon Defendants. Bluffdale provided 
these water services to the Defendants with the understanding and expectation that Defendants 
would pay for the same. Defendants had knowledge of receiving the benefit of the water services 
from Bluffdale. Defendants accepted and retained the benefit of the water services from 
Bluffdale. To permit Defendants to retain the benefit of Bluffdale's water services without 
compensating Bluffdale for those services would constitute an unconscionable and unjust 
enrichment of Defendants at Bluffdale's expense. Thus, Bluffdale's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be granted because Defendants have been unjustly enriched. 
6 
D. Third Claim for Relief - Defendants Impliedly Pn >missed to Pay Bluffdale.for the 
Water Services and Bluffdale Relied on this Promise to its Detriment 
In order to establish a promissory estoppel cause of action 1 incU r t It; ill k\ \ , c ij: laintiff 
must prove the following: (1) a promise reasonably expected to induce reliance; (2) reasonable 
reliance inducing action or forbearance on part, of promisee; and (3) detriment to promisee. See 
is no genuine issue of material fact as to each of the elements of Bluffdale's cause of action for 
promissory estoppel as alleged in the complaint. 
A s set foi tli abo1' • e,, Defendants promised1 to pay Bluffdale for the water services. 
Defendants did foresee or reasonably should have foreseen that Bluffdale would rely upon 
Defendants j : • w hen Bluffdale agreed to \ 
service. Bluffdale reasonably relied upon Defendants' promise to pay for the water services to 
Bluffdale's financial detriment ' Bluffdale gave Defendants $11,997.05 worth of water services 
estoppel to enforce Defendants'' promised, but unfulfilled, obligations to pay for the water 
service. Miruiei, ueiukiaiiLS should be estopped hum lai) my (lie existence ol a eouliad ei (lul 
they owe Bluffdale money pursuant to that contract. 
Defendants' promise is an implied promise to pay for the water services as evidenced by their receipt of 
water services. Anyone who receives water services expects to and should pay for those services. See BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 755 (6th ed. 1990) ("Implied Promise. Fiction which the law creates to render one liable on contract 
theory so as to avoid fraud or unjust enrichment,") 
; 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants received water from Bluffdale and refused to pay it. Because there is no 
genuine dispute of these dispositive facts, summary judgment should be entered granting all of 
Bluffdale's claims. 
DATED this / °lP day of April, 2005. 
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER 
)ALE GARDINER 
CRAIG R. KLEINMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bluffdale City 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BLUFFDALE 
CIT MOTTOM H)K SIIMM v m HUMJMENTwas 
served via U.S. First Class Mail, postage prepaid on the ^ I day . >l April, 2005 to the 
following: 
David K.Smith 
6925 Union Park Center 
Suite 600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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DALE GARDINER (#1147) 
CRAIG R. KLEINMAN (#8451) 
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER 
60 East South Temple, #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3434 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bluffdale City 
IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah Municipal 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TAYLOR SMITH, an individual; and 
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
a Utah Corporation 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SHANE JONES 
Civil No. 040914276 
Judge Atherton 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
1. Shane Jones, having first been duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
2. I am over the age of 21, have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein, 
and can competently testify thereto. 
3. I am the Bluffdale City (the "City") Engineer. 
4. I have been intimately involved with the Defendants and their construction and 
operation of I leritage Industrial Park. 
5. In approximately July, 1999, Defendant Taylor Smiih. on behalf of himself and 
his company, u^nuon i Wallingford Development (hereinafter co..vdivci* . )cicndanu> '), 
requested water service from Bluffdale. 
6. Bluffdale agreed to provide water services to Defendants. 
7. Bit iffdale expected to be paid fc i the "w ate r se i i ic ss it pro11' ide d to Defendants 
8. Defendants agreed to pay for the water services and they did not pay for the water 
services. 
9 . r" " > "> •»» - H s lor I leril ' * J 
29. 1098 state that the owner is to provide irrigation for all planting areas and landscaping 
including City parkstrips of the commercial site. See Declaration ^ , avenants page JX aiiachv,, 
hereto as Exhibit "A." 
10. On September 9, 1999,1 sent Defendant Taylor Smith a letter memorializing our 
each lot has its own irrigatioii system and the system serving the complete development can be 
abandoned, ^ a seller dated ^eptembu *K lc^'> hum MUIHC Jones to Taylor Smith attached 
hereto as Exhibit "B." 
2 
11. Because of this, Defendants knew that Bluffdale expected to be paid for the water 
services it provided to Defendants. 
12. Bluffdale relied upon the fact that Defendants would pay for the water services 
they received. 
DATED this $ (p day of April 2005. 
Shane Jones 
<£2^c~e_ \/&^><jb<? 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this o3k day of April, 2005. 
< S ^ * V TEDDIEK.BELL 
ufWmW\ NOTARY PUBUC - STATE OF UTAH BMEMM
 M X 7 5 s o y ^ REDWOOD WX 
BUflTOALE UT 04065 . 
My ComrfcExp. 09/02/200? 1 
Notary Public ^—' 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Al< HIM Vll ' M' 
3Q4 
S H A • \1 : I <U^c prepaid on the ^ f day of 
Apri l , 2005 to the following: 
mi i nl I1 " HI in in Ih 
Utiiuii I1 irk Center 
• 600 
ak', Ul.ihX'KMV 
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DALE GARDINER (#1147) 
CRAIG R. KLEINMAN (#8451) 
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER 
60 East South Temple, #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3434 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bluffdale City 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah Municipal 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TAYLOR SMITH, an individual; and 
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
a Utah Corporation 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRENT BLUTH 
Civil No. 040914276 
Judge Atherton 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
1. Brent Bluth, having first been duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
2. I am over the age of 21, have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein, 
and can competently testify thereto. 
3. • I bluffdale City (\hv "City" | Administrative Services Director. 
4. I oversee the City's Water Department and I am well familiar with Defendants' 
failure to pay their water bill. ' 
5. In approximately July, 1999, Defendant Taylor Smith, on behalf of himself and 
his company, Defendant Wallingford Development, asked BlufMale for water servia . 
6. . Bluffdale agreed to pro\ Iciei, « ater ser vices tc ! Defendants 
7. Bluff (dale expected to be paid for the water services it provided to Defendants. 
8. . ' Bluffdale sent water bills to Defendants but they were not paid, See examples ol 
i, v atei bills attached her eto as E: diibit" i Lr • ' • 
9. Defendants agreed to pay for the water services and they did not pay for the water 
services. 
10. Alternatively, Defendants knew that Bluffdale expected to be paid for the water 
services it provided to Defendants. 
11. Rltiffclalc relied \\\Utn |L tin I thai I leleinLmh would pa\ for (he water services 
they received. 
12 Hllutiikile pi'ouiled water services to Delendaub In >» <i|>pn>> im.ilel ; l"il ; I I"1' i'"1* 
to October 2, 2001. 
13. Despite receipt of several notices of delinquent payment, Defendants have refused 
to pay foi the water set v ices v hich the) received froi i I Bh iffdale 
2 
14. Defendants currently owe Bluffdale $11,997.05 for unpaid water services. 
15. This amount will continue to increase as interest continues to accrue. 
DATED this ^ L day of April, 2005. 
;dkr3dfe*£-
Brent Bluth 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ^ day of April, 2005. 
_ TEDDIEK.BE11 
NOTARY PUBUC-STATE Of UTAH 
14175 SOUTH REDWOOO R& 
_BUJR=OAlS UT 84065_ 
HyCdmm. Exp. 09/02/2007 
Notary Public 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
BRENT BLUTH was served via U.S. First Class Mail, postage prepaid on the day of 
April, 2005 to the following: 
David K. Smith 
6925 Union Park Center 
Suite 600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
4 
ATTACHMENT "E" 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting 
Affidavit of Taylor Smith 
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DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Utah State Bar No. 2993 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
Facsimile: (801) 566-8763 
Attorney for Defendant: TAYLOR SMITH and WALLINGFORD 
DEVELOPMENT, INC., A Utah Corporation. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah ) 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
TAYLOR SMITH, an individual; and 
WALLINFORD DEVELOPMENT, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
REPLY TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Case No. 040914276 
) Honorable Judith Atherton 
COMES NOW the Defendant, TAYLOR SMITH, for himself and on behalf of 
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation, and through Counsel, 
respectfully replies to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as follows: 
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CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff filed its claim for relief against the Defendant seeking a money judgment for 
$11,385.62 for water service allegedly requested by the Defendant from the Plaintiff from 
approximately July 1, 1999 to October 2, 2001. 
2. The water provided was on a parking strip owned by Bluffdale City Corporation. 
3. Plaintiffs seek judgment on the basis of three causes of actions or theories for relief. 
The first theory asserted is breach of contract. The second theory for relief is based upon the 
allegation of unjust enrichment. The third theory for relief is based upon an implied promise to 
pay. 
4. At no time did the Defendants enter into any written contract or agreement to pay for 
water provided to the city's parking strip. 
5. Defendants specifically aver in Taylor Smith's affidavit that he never entered into any 
oral agreement or contract, or engage in any activity that might be construed as consent for the 
city to provide water to the parking strip for which he or Wallingford Development might be 
responsible. 
6. At no time did the Defendants offer to pay or in any way lead the city with any 
presumption that they would pay if the city provided water to the parking strip in question. 
7. Inasmuch as the water provided by the city to its own parking strip, it is difficult to 
conclude that the defendant was unjustly enriched by the city's service of water. 
8. After a period of several months, the city on its own volition, terminated water service 
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to the parking strip. 
ARGUMENT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS INAPPROPRIATE 
WHERE THERE ARE ISSUES OF DISPUTED FACT 
It is well settled law that summary judgment cannot be granted in a matter where there are 
issues of material disputed fac which remain in any case. Bill Brown Realty, Inc. V. Abbott, 
562 P2d 191 (Utah , 1975). A summary judgment motion should only be granted when all of the 
facts entitling the moving party to a judgment are clearly established or admitted. Sorenson v. 
Beers, 585 P2d 485 (Utah, 1979) 
The court is prohibited from considering weight to be given any fact or the credibility of 
any witness's statement given in support of a motion for summary judgment; the court's job is to 
simply determine that no material fact relevant to the granting of the motion is disputed. 
Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292,431 P2d 126 (1967) 
A material issue of fact exists where, on the basis of the facts on record, reasonable minds 
could differ on whether defendant's conduct measures up to the standards raised on the issue of 
whether medical malpractice occurred on the part of the Defendant or not. Jackson v. Dubney, 
645 P2d 613 (Utah, 1982) 
In a motion for summary judgment the adverse party is entitled to have the co urt survey 
the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable 
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to that adverse party. Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P2d 297 (1953), Bowen 
v. Riverton City, 656 P2d 434 (Utah. 1982) 
It takes only one sworn statement to dispute averments on the other side of the 
controversy to create an issue of fact which precludes summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v. 
Adams, 542 P2d 191 (Utah, 1975). 
THERE ARE NUMEROUS ISSUES OF FACT WHICH REQUIRE A 
DECISION BY THE TRIER OF FACT BEFORE THE CASE 
CAN BE RESOLVED AND WHICH PRECLUDE A RULING BY 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. The Plaintiff asserts that there is a breach of contract. No physical evidence has been 
produced to suggest that there was ever a written agreement between the parties that would 
require the Defendants would pay for water provided by the Plaintiff for the city's own parking 
strip. 
2. The Plaintiff asserts that there was an implied contract to provide water service. 
Again, the Defendant, in his affidavit, denies that either he or Wallingford Development, Inc. 
ever agreed verbally either implicitly or explicitly to pay for water provided by Bluffdale to the 
city's parking strip. 
3. The Plaintiff attempts, by letter dated September 9, 1999, some three months after the 
water began to be supplied to the parking strip, to suggest that it implies that the defendant as 
alleged developers are responsible for the water "until each lot has its own irrigation system." 
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4. This was never agreed to by the Defendants, and in fact the Defendants deny that they 
agreed to such a proposal, and specifically allege they wrote to Bluffdale City advising them they 
were not going to be responsible for any water supplied to the city's parking strips. 
5. The Defendants further aver in their affidavit, they were not owners of Heritage 
Industrial Park, nor signers of the Restrictive Covenants. 
6. The Defendants further allege that there was a global settlement reached between SK 
Development and Bluffdale City on May 20, 2004 which renders the Plaintiffs lawsuit moot. 
7. As to each theory for relief there remain issues of disputed fact to preclude any entry 
of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
There are significant issues of fact which remain in dispute in this case and which would 
preclude the granting of a summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied and the case scheduled for 
trial. 
DATED this / / day of May, 2005. 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to Counsel for the 
Plaintiff, this / / day of May, 2005, addressed as follows: 
DALE GARDINER 
GRAIG R. KLEINMAN 
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER 
Attorneys at Law 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3434 
£ c 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Page 6 of 6 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Utah State Bar No. 2993 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
Facsimile: (801) 566-8763 
?ttiai Disrsif cr cooay 
Third Judicial District 
^ 2 0 2005 
SALT LAKE COUNT 
Deputy Gtefk" 
Attorney for Defendant: TAYLOR SMITH and WALLINGFORD 
By, 
DEVELOPMENT, INC., A Utah Corporation. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TAYLOR SMITH, an individual; and 
WALLINFORD DEVELOPMENT, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF TAYLOR SMITH 
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 040914276 
Honorable Judith Atherton 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
: ss. 
COMES NOW the Defendant, TAYLOR SMITH, for himself and on behalf of 
Page 1 of 5 
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation, as follows: 
1. Taylor Smith, having been first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
2. I am over the age of 21 years, and have personal knowledge of the matters set forth 
herein, and can competently testify thereto. 
3. At no time did I ever request on behalf of myself or WaUingford Development water 
service from the Plaintiff, Bluffdale City, a Municipal Corporation for parking strips, the 
watering of which Plaintiff seeks recovery from the Defendants. 
4. I never agreed to pay for the water provided to the parking strips in question. 
5. I was approached several times by representatives of Bluffdale City Corporation to 
sign an agreement to set a meter and to pay for water on the parking strips and I refused each 
time. 
6. The letter dated September 9,1999 from Shane C. Jones to myself was sent after I 
had refused to agree to enter into any agreement for payment of water on the parking strips. I 
never consented to nor agreed to Mr. Jones' "understanding." 
7. I also believe that I had personally told Mr. Jones that I refused to pay for any water. 
In any event, after I refused to pay for watering the parking strips. Why did they not shut off the 
water after no payment rather than leaving on for years after turning it on? 
8. The portion of the document as Exhibit B to Shane C. Jones' Affidavit, numbered 
pages 28 and 29 does not represent an agreement between Bluffdale City and myself. It 
represents Restrictive Covenants of which WaUingford Dvelopment, Inc. was a joint party with 
SK Development, Inc. Bluffdale City, however, was not a party to the Restrictive Covenants. 
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9. The Restrictive Covenants are between individual owners of the property and the 
Industrial Park Owners' Association, and refers to individual owners taking responsibility for the 
park strips owned by them or in front of their properties, and not Bluffdale City. 
10. Wallingford Development, Inc., and SK Development, Inc. Were the owners of 
Heritage Industrial Park, and joint signators on the Restrictive Covenants. 
11. The parking strips in question for which water was provided belonged to and was 
operated by Bluffdale City Corporation. 
12. Any requirements for landscaping and maintaining the park strips were the sole 
obligation of SK Development, and were bonded for by SK Development, Inc. and not by your 
affiants. 
13. There is a "global settlement" agreement dated May 20, 2004 between SK 
Development, Inc. And Bluffdale, which is part of the exhibit attached to Defendants' Responses 
to Plaintiffs' Request for Production of Documents, which Defendant believes renders the issues 
presented in Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment moot. 
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SrtsuM^ 
SUBSCRIBED and Sworn 
My Commission Expires: 
•— 
this i ' day of day of May, 2005. 
OAVIOK SMITH 
NOTARY PUBLIC'STATE t* UTAH 
M2S UNION PARK CENTER STE 600 
MJDVALE UT 84047 
COMMISSION EXPIRES: 04-21-2007 
[REPUBLIC, Residing at 
Salt Lake County, Utah 84111 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
TAYLOR SMITH IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to Counsel for the Plaintiff, this ' * d a y of May, 2005, addressed as follows: 
DALE GARDINER 
GRAIG R. KLEINMAN 
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER 
Attorneys at Law 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3434 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
C X ^ 
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ATTACHMENT "F" 
Jones letter of September 9.1999 
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BLUFFDALE CITY 
14175 SOUTH REDWOOD ROAD • BLUFFDALE, UTAH 84065 (801) 254-2200 
September 9, 1999 
Mr. Taylor Smith 
Lexington Construction 
830 West 14600 South 
Bluffdale, UT 84065 
RE: STATUS OF WATER METER FOR IRRIGATION OF PARK STRIPS 
Dear Mr. Smith, 
The City has installed a water meter to measure the amount of water that is being used to 
irrigate the park strips throughout the various phases of Heritage Industrial Park. It is our 
understanding that a connection fee for this meter has not and it will not be collected but 
that you as the developer will be responsible to pay for the water that is used until each 
lot has its own irrigation system and the system serving the complete development can be 
abandoned. 
Sincerely, 
Shane C. JorWP.E. 
Bluffdale CftyTSngineer/Building Official 
C \MD\dcv\h critagcindustriaJparkWiitLirirri^atioiimdtCf 
ATTACHMENT "Gr 
Protective Covenants 
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AFTER RECORDING, RETURN TU-
SK DEVELOPMENT, INC. 
P.O. BOX 95005 
SOUTH JORDAN, UT 84095-5005 
0RI6INAL 
\0 
DECLARATION OF PROTECTIVE COVENANTS 
FOR HERITAGE INDUSTRIAL PARK 
THIS DECLARATION OF PROTECTIVE COVENANTS FOR HERITAGE 
INDUSTRIAL PARK (the "Declaration"), is made this 17th day of October, 1997, by S K 
DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation, and WALLJNGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC, 
a Utah Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the "Declarant"). 
W I T N E S S E T H 
WHEREAS, Declarant is the fee simple owner of certain real property located in Bluffdale, 
Salt Lake County, Utah and being more particularly described in Exhibit"A" attached hereto and 
by this reference made a part hereof (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"); and 
WHEREAS, the Property is known as Phase One of "Heritage Industrial Park" (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Park"); and 
WHEREAS, Declarant intends to own and to develop portions of the Park itself and/or to 
convey portions of the Park to other persons or entities for development, all in accordance with 
certain conditions, covenants and restrictions pertaining to the ownership and development of the 
portions of the Park; and 
WHEREAS, Declarant desires to subject initially the Property to certain conditions, 
covenants and restrictions as more particularly hereinafter set forth, and Declarant intends in the 
future to subject additional portions of the Park to the conditions, covenants, and restrictions of this 
Declaration. 
NOW, THEREFORE, Declarant hereby subjects the Property, to certain protective 
covenants, said protective covenants being more particularly set forth as follows: 
L DEFINITIONS 
The following works of art and terms when used or referred to in this Declaration or any 
amendment or supplement hereto or modifications hereof (unless the context clearly indicates 
otherwise) shall have the following meanings: 
(a.) "Architectural Review Committee shall mean and refer to a committee 
but not limited to: front, side and rear yard setback area will be planted and 
landscaped according to an approved plan-
3 • Plant Material: The basic plant materials to provide overall landscape continuity are 
trees, shrubbery, groundcover and lawn. The Architectural Review Committee has 
approved Blue Spruce and Maple trees. As a rule, all trees should be of the mioimum 
six of 2 V* * caliper for Maple trees and six (6) feet for Blue Spruce. The basic lawn 
plantings will be supplemented by appropriate trees, shrubs and groundcover. Plants 
will be arranged to highlight building entries, soften and provide scale to building 
masses and site development. To ensure an adequate buffer, additional landscape 
easements (setbacks) may be required of parcels adjacent to main entries. Plant 
species prohibited by the ordinances of Bluffdale City shall not be used. 
4. Site Yard Landscaping: Typical side yard landscaping will consist of accent framing 
or screening, depending on specific circumstances. Side yard areas will consist of 
informal tree planting of approved species; and intermittent screening of at least six 
(6) feet high on other property line is required to screen any service areas. This can 
be accomplished through the use of a combination of shrubs of approved species and 
mounding. 
5. Landscaping Mounding: Where mounding or earth contouring is required, smooth 
transition with soft natural forms are desired. Trees are not to be planted directly on 
top of mounds. Berming or mounding is encouraged where possible. 
6. Suggested Plant Materials: To maintain continuity and a sense of order, the plant 
list will comply with the American National Standards Institutes (ANSI) 60.1 Nursery 
Stock design as established by the American Association of Nurserymen. 
7. Landscape Maintenance: It js the responsibility of each Owner, at the Owner's 
expense, to maintain its individual Commercial Site, including; but not limited to, 
irrigation, lawn mowing, tree and shrub trimming (including replacement of dead trees 
or shrubs), fertilization and weed and insect control. 
IRRIGATION 
It is the responsibility of the individual Owner to provide irrigation for all planting areas, all 
landscaping including City parkstrips of its Commercial Site. The irrigation system will 
provide 100 % coverage and will use water which will not cause rust staining on paving, 
walls and so on. 
In area adjacent to street rights-of-way, it is the responsibility of the Owner to install the 
sprinkler irrigation system that provides coverage to the back of curb for the street right-of-
way. By doing this, a complete and uniform irrigation system is provided. An Irrigation 
Layout must be submitted to the Architectural Review Committee for approval for each 
Commercial Site as a part of the Plan Review Process. 
The Owner shall record a covenant providing that the placement of such irrigation system in 
-28-
any easement or right-of-way dedicated to a governmental entity is inferior to the rights of 
cable television companies, Bluffdale City and all utility companies fTJtilities") in such 
easements or rights-of-way and that such Utilities shall have no duty to repair, replace or 
restore any irrigation system located therein. 
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of Utah. Venue shall be proper only in the District Court for the Third Judicial District or the Circuit 
Court for the Third Judicial Circuit, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
31. SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS 
This Declaration shall be binding upon, and shall insure to the benefit of Declarant, the 
Architectural Review Committee and Owners and the respective successors and assigns ofDeclarant, 
the Architectural Review Committee and Owners. 
JN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being the Declarant herein, has hereunto set 
its hand this 17th day of October, 1997. 
"DECLARANT" 
S K DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation 
B y : _ 
Steven E. Sinner, President 
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah 
Corporation 
Bv: ^~FT^(/T\ "5(AAA^h P ^ . 
S, Taylor Smith, President 
GO 
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CD 
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State of UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me on this 17th day of October, 1997, 
by Steven E. Sinner, personally known to me to be the President of SK Development, Inc., a Utah 
Corporation. 
»m » * * GAYE HUSBAND BROWB* k 
Notary Public I 
State of Utah I 
f
 My C d m r a Expres Mar2Z200O F 
- — 99XSoChoe9nVteyScxifriJontenUt84095f 
My Commis^Jn^^fyc^i • v>* 
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^nAUtdl&MA) 
ARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
S&atk Jordm . UT 
[Notary Seal] 
State of UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me on this 17°* day of October, 1997, 
by S. Taylor Smith, personally known to me to be the President of Wallingford Development, 
Inc., a Utah Corporation. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
Marsha ^ . loon 
Residing at: 
South \Jo&dav). LUah 
rNolaraSeaH m m r *» A 
GAYE HUSBASD BROWER j 
Notary Public 
State of Utah 
%ConrmBq*esMar22 2000 
9930 So Cha9en Way Sex* Jordan Ut 84096 
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